INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES
UNDER SECTION 1983
In 1961 the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision
firmly endorsing a federal statutory remedy for the deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Interpreting broadly the phrase, "under color of any statute," the
Court in Monroe v. Pape 1 held that section 1983 2 creates a cause of
action against police officers acting both unconstitutionally and beyond
the authority of any state or local law. During the decade since
Monroe, civil suits under section 1983 have proliferated.
Although the Monroe Court permitted recovery against the individual officers acting unconstitutionally, it affirmed the dismissal of the
suit against the city of Chicago.3 The Court rejected arguments
raising the general ineffectiveness of private remedies against police
officers and other municipal agents,' and relied exclusively on the legislative debates surrounding the defeat of a proposed amendment to the
Civil Rights Act. The Court concluded that:
The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within
federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word "person" was
used in this particular Act to include them.5
Subsequent lower court decisions have dealt summarily with damage actions against municipalities,' and attempts to distinguish or dilute
the Monroe prohibition against such actions have been largely unsuccessful. For example, in Brown v. Town of Caliente,7 the plaintiff
1365 U.S. 167 (1961).
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
Referred to as R.S. § 1979 in Monroe, this section
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

3 365 U.S. at 192.
4
1d. at 191.
GId.
6 See, e.g., Bright v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Wallach v. City of
Pagedale, 359 F2d 57 (8th Cir. 1966); Blume v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698
(5th Cir. 1966) ; Spampinato v. City of New York, 311 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962).

S392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1968).
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

390

[Vo1.119:389

argued that Monroe only incorporated the doctrine of sovereign immunity into section 1983. Thus when the state waived immunity for
its municipalities, it also removed the bar to actions under the federal
statute.' The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
The Supreme Court having considered the Civil Rights Act,
and having held municipalities were not liable under it, we
cannot see how any action by the state . . . abolishing sovereign immunity . . . can bring about a different reading or
9
different result to Monroe v. Pape ....

Judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of the statutory immunity beyond cities to other bodies politic,"0 including township
commissioners, 11 a county board of education," a city police department,13 and a city hospital.' 4 Essentially, those bodies exercising the
powers and performing the functions of local government may not be
held liable for damages because a judgment against a governing body
would have to be satisfied from the public treasury. 5
But the status of municipal immunity in cases seeking injunctive
relief is unsettled. An injunction against the municipality may be the
only effective way to restrain a particular act or plan of action by a
municipal governing body or administrative agency. For example, if
the city council denies a building permit or zoning variance because of
an applicant's race, an injunction should run to the local governing
8

Id. at 547.

) Id. at 548.
10 States and counties have been consistently held immune from suits for damages
under § 1983. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia,
413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970) ; Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United States ex rel. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d
120 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Garrison v. County of Bernalillo, 338 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir.
1964).
"1Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ; Roberts v. Trapnell,
213 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
12 Patton v. Bennett, 304 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
United States ex tel. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965).
14 United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F2d 84
(3d Cir. 1969).
'5 See Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1962). In Roberts, a
suit against the commissioners of Lower Merion Township was dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dismissal was deemed necessary
under the rule of Monroe because the commissioners held the corporate power of
the township. Difficulties may arise in applying this rationale to suits against individual city officials because § 1983 was obviously intended to apply to deprivations of
rights by individuals acting under color of state authority. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) ; Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Perhaps
Monroe permits damage actions only against municipal officers sued in their individual rather than official capacities. In any event, actions against individual officers
which in effect seek recovery from the local government are contrary to Monroe.
See Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D. Me. 1970).
'3
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body itself to be most effective. 6 Relief against the individual members of the council might not bind their successors in office or might
not reach the administrative agents responsible for implementing final
orders of the council.1 7 Furthermore, joinder of all parties may prove
unduly cumbersome.
If the plaintiff seeks to enjoin harassment by municipal law
enforcement officers,' 8 an injunction against the municipality offers him
blanket protection. The plaintiff may be unable to identify the policemen directly responsible for past harassment, or they may be too
numerous to join as parties. Injunctive relief against those individuals
would undoubtedly not reach policemen uninvolved in previous deprivations of civil rights. An injunction issued to the police commissioner
would prevent authorized harassment but might not include police
officers acting contrary to department policy and beyond the control
of the commissioner. A decree against the department would bind all
the police but might not prevent civil rights violations by other law
enforcement agencies such as the sheriff's office. Equitable relief
against the municipality, however, provides the broadest possible
protection for civil rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States because it reaches every city official or employee with
notice of the injunction who might violate those rights.
In view of the shared interests of police and prosecuting attorneys,
it is naive to rely on the possibility of criminal sanctions as a deterrent
to unconstitutional conduct. 9 In addition, civil actions based on
theories of tort law have proved largely ineffective in preventing
abusive conduct by government officials, 2° in part because of the nature
of the injuries suffered by parties alleging deprivation of constitutional
rights. As one observor has noted:
The vast majority of police transgressions are acts of harassment and bullying which never lead to prosecutions-unwarranted arrests, illegal searches, unreasonable disruptions of
harmless conduct, verbal insults. Such violations leave no
visible scars; the victim usually does not suffer bodily injury
or loss of property. Yet to the individual victim these acts
constitute serious intrusions upon his privacy, dignity, and
2
security.

1

13See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425

F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).

17See FED. P Civ. P. 65(d).
18See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969).
19 Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143, 144 n.9 (1968). See also Schwartz, Complaints Against the
Police: Experience of the Community Rights Division of the PhiladelphiaDistrict
Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1970).
2
2

Note, jipra note 19, at 144.

1 Id. 143-44 (footnote omitted).

392

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.119:39

Thus, injunctive relief is essential to the effective enforcement of guaranteed rights because of the breadth of the protection necessary and
the drawbacks of other methods of enforcement. 2
But injunctive relief under section 1983 may be unavailable and
suits directly under the Constitution for such relief have not been
Because the petitioners in Monroe sought damwidely recognized.
ages from the city of Chicago for alleged deprivation of fourteenth
amendment rights, the Court was not called upon to resolve the question
of availability of injunctive relief under the statute. Yet in a somewhat
enigmatic footnote, the Court may have precluded injunctive as well
as damage actions:
In a few cases in which equitable relief has been sought, a
municipality has been named, along with city officials, as defendant where violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were alleged.
. * * The question dealt with in our opinion was not raised
in those cases, either by the parties or by the Court. Since
we hold that a municipal corporation is not a "person" within
the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any
longer be drawn from those cases. 4
22 One commentator has noted the utility of injunctive relief in securing rights
guaranteed by state civil rights acts:
A number of factors combine to make injunctive relief particularly appropriate
to remedy infringement of an individual's civil rights. The traditional basis
for the exercise of equity powers is inadequacy of the remedy at law. When
criminal enforcement is lax or difficult to obtain, the legal remedy is, for all
practical purposes, inadequate. And even when enforcement is adequate, the
imposition of a criminal penalty is an unsatisfactory substitute for the actual
enjoyment of the rights created by legislation. The award of monetary
damages is equally unsatisfactory because of the nature of the personal right
infringed. Not only are such damages difficult to assess, they cannot provide
full compensation. Another factor of practical importance is the likelihood
of a multiplicity of suits at law under those statutes which make a civil action
available. Finally, the injunction offers the flexibility needed in dealing with
a complex social problem.
Comment, Availability of Injunctive Relief Under State Civil Rights Acts, 24 U. CHI.
L. REv. 174, 180 (1956).
23 If injunctive relief directly under the Constitution were available, the problem
discussed herein would be less acute. A discussion of this possibility is beyond the
scope of this Comment, but for an extensive treatment of the issues, see Hill, ConThe Supreme Court may
stitutional Remedies, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1109 (1969).
illuminate some of the issues involved when it decides Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. granted,
399 U.S. 905 (1970). The lower court dismissed an action for damages under the
fourth amendment after it had assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
The resolution of this case should explicitly determine whether the Constitution
creates a cause of action in a private citizen for governmental violations of constitutional rights. If it does, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) might provide the jurisdictional basis for an action for injunctive relief.
However this question is resolved, suits under § 1983 will remain important, for
that section also permits redress of rights secured by statutes of the United States.
In addition, § 1983 might be read as a congressional limitation on suits under the
Constitution embraced by the statute. Furthermore, a reinterpretation of § 1983 and
Monroe to permit injunctive relief against municipalities avoids difficult and pervasive
constitutional issues which the Court might prefer to bypass.
24 365 U.S. at 191 n.50.
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Because the Monroe Court resolved the issue of municipal liability
through a definition of the statutory term "person," it would seem
logically consistent to interpret Monroe as prohibiting any action whatsoever against municipal bodies: a municipality not a "person" in a
damages suit does not become a "person" when the action is equitable
under the same statute.'
But this view of section 1983 and Monroe has not been uniformly
adopted by the lower federal courts." This Comment will briefly note
subsequent decisions interpreting Monroe, and will then reexamine the
legislative history of section 1983 to determine if any distinction between damages and injunctive relief is tenable in light of that history.
Finally, this Comment will suggest a rationale permitting injunctive
relief against municipalities consistent with the prohibition against
actions for damages.
Several lower federal courts-at least one deriving its authority
2 7
others, from
squarely from footnote fifty of Justice Douglas' opinion;
within
"person"
a
not
is
a
municipality
that
the Court's broad holding
2
equitable
for
suits
dismissed
s-have
1983
the contemplation of section
relief against municipalities. Yet, other courts, notably the Seventh
Circuit, have distinguished between section 1983 suits for damages
2 9
In Adams
against municipalities and those seeking injunctive relief.
0
of
rationale
the
that
held
Circuit
Seventh
the
Ridge,"
Park
of
City
v.
2
5 Two Supreme Court cases since Monroe may cast some doubt on this interpretation of footnote fifty in the majority opinion. In Turner v. City of Memphis,
369 U.S. 350 (1962), the Court held in a per curiam opinion that an injunction
should issue to restrain the city from maintaining a segregated restaurant in the
Memphis Municipal Airport. The opinion noted briefly that the action had been
initiated under § 1983, but did not discuss the "personality" of the city or cite Monroe.
Likewise, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969), the Court treated the school district as a proper party under § 1983.
Once again the opinion did not discuss or even mention Monroe. Perhaps these
cases may be explained by the language of footnote fifty: "The question dealt with
in (Monroe] . . . was not raised in those cases, either by the parties or by the
Court." 365 U.S. at 191 n.50. Because the Court did not discuss the municipality
as a "person," and because subsequent lower federal court decisions are in conflict,
compare cases cited notes 27-28 infra, with cases cited note 32 infra, these two cases
have not put the issue to rest.

2

6See notes 30-32 infra & accompanying text.

27
In Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967), a suit for damages and injunctive relief
against the enforcement of a municipal ordinance and state statute, the court recognized that Monroe involved only an action for damages but nevertheless concluded
that footnote fifty disposed of the issue of equitable relief. Id. at 324.
2
sSee, e.g., Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969); Johnson v.
Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Sutton v. City of Philadelphia, 286
F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fowler v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 638, 646-47
(C.D. Cal. 1966); Pinkus v. Arnebergh, 258 F. Supp. 996 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
29 While recognizing that injunctions by their terms may either prohibit or
compel action, this Comment deals chiefly with prohibitory injunctions-those restraining unconstitutional acts. Injunctions which compel a municipality to appropriate funds or to take specific, expensive action closely resemble damage actions in
practical effect, and will not be treated herein.

30293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
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Monroe was inapplicable to injunction actions. The court found in the
factual basis for the Supreme Court's decision
several inherent reasons for excluding municipalities from
liability for damages, such as unauthorized misconduct of the
officers, lack of power of [a] city to indemnify plaintiffs for
such misconduct, and a city's governmental immunity in the
31
exercise of its police powers ....
Finding these reasons inapposite when an injunction alone was at issue,
the court restrained the enforcement of a city ordinance as repugnant
to the fourteenth amendment; in the Seventh Circuit an injunction will
issue against a municipality under section 1983.32
Should the Supreme Court be called upon to resolve this conflict
among circuits and state precisely the breadth of the Monroe prohibition, it may well wish to reexamine the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Act of April 20, 1871-the origin of section
1983. The Monroe majority particularly stressed the debates on the
Sherman amendment 3 providing for recovery of damages against mu31Id. at 587.
2See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Sanberg v.
Daley, 306 F. Supp. 277, 278 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (dictum).
Other courts have also expressed the view that the Monroe prohibition is inapplicable to suits for injunctive relief. See Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School
Dist., 427 F2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3073
(U.S. Aug. 19, 1970) (No. 561) ; Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th
Cir. 1970) ; United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F2d 1, 11 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum) ;
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) ; Service Employees
Int'l Union v. County of Butler, 306 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Prisojers'
Rights Under Section 1983, 6 CRIm. L. BuuL. 237, 263 (1970). In Dailey, the court
concluded that footnote fifty of Justice Douglas' opinion did not compel a conclusion
of absolute municipal immunity.
We read that footnote as differentiating between actions for damages and
actions for equitable relief and as intending no bar to equitable actions for
injunctive relief against invasions of a plaintiff's federal constitutional rights
by municipal action.
425 F2d at 1038.
33As originally passed by the Senate, the amendment read:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall
be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed,
wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be
whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to deprive
any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising any such
right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in
every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which any
of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation
to the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to his legal
representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by such
person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was committed,
to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and
against said county, city, or parish; and execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit, and may be levied upon any property, real or
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nicipalities and counties for property losses and personal injuries resulting from civil disturbances. The Court accurately and succinctly
described the events leading to the defeat of the amendment:
When the bill that became the Act of April 20, 1871, was
being debated in the Senate, Senator Sherman of Ohio proposed an amendment which would have made "the inhabitants
of the county, city, or parish" in which certain acts of
violence occurred liable "to pay full compensation" to the
person damaged or his widow or legal representative. The
amendment was adopted by the Senate. The House, however,
rejected it. The Conference Committee reported another
version. The House rejected the Conference report. In a
second conference the Sherman amendment was dropped
34

But the reasons for the rejection are not apparent from the Court's
opinion.8 5
personal, of any person in said county, city, or parish; and the said county,
city, or parish may recover the full amount of said judgment, cost, and
interest from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in
such riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
CoxG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1871). Although amended in conference,
few substantive changes were made in the first portion of the provision. In addition
to adding an explicit requirement of intent and making several minor word changes,
the revised Sherman amendment contained additional language recognizing the liability of the municipality only after the judgment was not satisfied by the actual
wrongdoers:
[A]ny payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by
the plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual defendant
therein within two months next after the recovery of such judgment upon
execution duly issued against such individual defendant in such judgment,
and returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced against such county,
city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any
other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a
lien as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or parish,
as upon the other property thereof. And the court in any such action may
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein prior to issue joined,
to the end that justice may be done. And the said county, city, or parish
may recover the full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in
such riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And such
county, city, or parish, so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's
rights under such judgment.
Id. 749.
Representative Shellabarger explained the effect of this amendment as follows:
First, it does make a liability for a class of damages or injuries which
result from riotous disorders ...
Next, the amendment agreed to by the committee of conference completely changes the remedy granted for the mischief, by preventing a claimant
entitled to recover from resorting to property of individuals at all and confining his right of recovery to the county or city in which the mischief was
done. . . . Then, as to the method of enforcement of the judgment when
recovered, it provides they shall have the remedies applicable in cases of
judgments against corporations of this municipal character.
Id. 751.
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The debates make clear that opponents of the amendment were
concerned primarily with two related but distinct problems: first,
whether Congress had the power to compel a local government to raise
taxes to pay a judgment against it; and second, whether Congress
could make a municipality liable for failing to prevent civil disorders
which the state had not empowered it to prevent. As Senator Trumbull stated:
I do not know where the Government of the United
States gets the constitutional authority to go into the States
and establish police regulations. I do not know where the
Government of the United States gets the authority to go into
the county in which I live, or the city or the town where I
may live, and compel it to raise taxes to pay judgments, or
where it gets the authority to take money out of the treasury
of the county or town. I know of no such constitutional
authority."6
Accepting the generally held constitutional premise that Congress
could not impose a tax upon the states,37 opponents of the Sherman
amendment argued that it was also beyond the power of the United
States to inflict liabilities and resulting taxes upon a municipal corporation or other integral part or creature of a state.38 Representative
Poland observed:
I did understand from the action and vote of the House that
the House had solemnly decided that in their judgment
Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of State law. 9
Opponents of the amendment challenged its wisdom as well as its constitutionality. Predicting the dire results of a law permitting recovery
34 365 U.S.- at 188-89 (footnotes omitted).
35 The Court makes a general reference to doubts entertained by some members
of Congress concerning Congress' power to impose civil liability upon municipalities.
Id. at 190.
36 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 759 (1871) ; see id. 762 (remarks of Senator
Stevenson).
3
This case held that
7See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
the national government could not constitutionally tax the salary of a state judge.
Decided shortly before the debates on the Sherman amendment, Day was cited
with approval by opponents of the amendment during those debates. See, e.g.,
(remarks of Representative Blair);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871)
id. 764 (remarks of Senator Davis).
38

See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (remarks of Representative Blair);

id. 764 (remarks of Senator Casserly).
39

Id. 804.
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of damages from cities, members of Congress envisioned absolute congressional control of cities 40 and the eventual destruction of smaller
municipalities.4' These congressmen and senators feared with Senator
Thurman that a lien on county or town property to satisfy judgments
would halt the operation of the local government by diverting funds
earmarked for essential services toward payment of the federally imA few may have agreed with Senator Casserly
posed obligations.'
that the amendment would authorize the attachment and sale of the
courthouse, jail, or other municipal property to pay the judgment.4 3 In
spite of attempts by proponents to characterize the Sherman amendment
as a mutual insurance provision," most members of Congress apparently viewed it as an attempt to punish criminally a subdivision of
the state for acts done within its boundaries.'
Congress also feared that the amendment would impose an affirmative duty on the municipality or county to prevent civil disturbances
which might cause personal injury or property damage regardless of
whether the state had empowered the local body to prevent such disturbances.4 In effect, the amendment would compel states to exercise
their police powers in a particular manner,47 a result thought to be
unauthorized by the fourteenth amendment, 48 the constitutional basis for
the legislation. And, of course, the city would be required to pay for
damages it could not prevent without adequate police powers granted
by the state.4 9
The Sherman amendment and its opponents focused primarily on
damage actions against municipalities, and the legislative history should
be read accordingly. By allowing equitable remedies under the Act of
April 20, 1871, Congress would not have imposed a direct tax on local
governments because prohibitory injunctions do not generally require
the appropriation of funds and the consequent depletion of the public
treasury. 0 Fears that counties might be bankrupted or town jails
40

See id. 788-89 (remarks of Representative Kerr).

41 See id. 763 (remarks of Senator Casserly).
42 See id. 772.
43 See
44

id. 763.

See id. 792 (remarks of Representative Butler).

45See id. 788 (remarks of Representative Kerr); id. 777 (remarks of Senator
Frelinghuysen).
46 See id. 791 (remarks of Representative Willard).
47 See id. 795 (remarks of Representative Blair).
48

See id. 777 (remarks of Senator Frelinghuysen).

49 See id. 773 (remarks of Senator Thurman).
Senator Thurman quoted a Kentucky statute which rendered municipalities liable for riot damage and he noted particularly that the city would be liable only if it had the ability to prevent the damage.
50
See note 29 supra.
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attached to satisfy judgments under the amendment are groundless
when applied to injunction actions. Similarly, injunctions restraining
deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States would not impose duties on the local government which it is
not empowered to fulfill. A prohibitory injunction under section 1983
imposes no further obligation than that the municipality act within the
limits of its authority: the municipality is not required to act beyond
its power-it is required to refrain from so acting.5 1
Because the reasons underlying the defeat of the Sherman amendment do not apply to injunctive relief, the Forty-Second Congress
probably intended to incorporate into section 1983 whatever injunctive
remedy was then available in federal courts against municipalities. The
law in 1871 was clear: municipal corporations could be enjoined in
federal courts.
Textwriters of the late nineteenth century agreed that municipalities might be enjoined in courts of equity. Writing in 1872, Judge
John Dillon noted:
[S]ince these corporations hold their powers in trust for the
public benefit, and since the remedy by injunction or by bill
in equity is often more efficacious than any other to restrain
and correct municipal abuses, the spirit of the later cases is to
favor a relaxation, rather than a strict application of the rule
. . . which denies the right to go into equity if there be a
plain and full remedy at law. .

.

. Generally speaking, equity

will interfere in favor of, or against, municipal corporations,
on the same principles by which it is guided in other cases.52
At the very least, courts of equity had jurisdiction to enjoin municipal
corporations when there existed no adequate remedy at law-and
probably a less stringent standard applied. 3 A leading authority on
injunctive relief also recognized such jurisdiction:
The jurisdiction of courts of equity to restrain the proceedings of municipal corporations, at the suit of citizens and
taxpayers, where such proceedings encroach upon private
rights and are productive of irreparable injury, may be regarded as well established.5 4
51

See Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (no public
treasury expense when injunction is sought; Congress never contemplated immunity
of municipal officials from suits for injunctions under Civil Rights Act).
52J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LA-W OF MUNICIPAL CORPRATIONS

§ 728, at 678

(1872).
53

Injunction is generally recognized and used as an appropriate remedy to
be invoked both for and against the municipality for the protection of public
and private rights, when irremediable loss or damage is menaced.
R. COOLEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 161, at 488 (1914).
54 J. HIGH,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INjUNcTIONs

§ 783, at 463 (1874).
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Unquestionably, then, leading scholars at the time of the enactment
of the 1871 Civil Rights Act recognized equitable jurisdiction over
municipal corporations and treated injunctive relief to protect private
rights as a part of that jurisdiction.
An 1870 decision of the Supreme Court, Dows v. City of
Chicago," reaffirmed this jurisdiction in the federal courts. Although
refusing to restrain the city of Chicago from collecting its taxes, the
Court stated:
No court of equity will, therefore, allow its injunction to
issue to restrain [the municipal officers'] action, except where
it may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizen whose
property is taxed, and he has no adequate remedy by the
ordinary processes of the law. It must appear that the
enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits,
or produce irreparable injury, or where the property is real
estate, throw a cloud upon the title of the complainant, before
the aid of a court of equity can be invoked. 50
Lower federal courts also invoked this equity power to enjoin wrongful
acts by municipal corporations. In Lambell v. Washington,5 7 the
circuit court enjoined a municipality from enforcing an ordinance
granting a monopoly to plaintiff's competitor. The court invoked
traditional equitable principles to reach its decision." Similarly, in
Coulson v. Portland,59 the court enjoined the city of Portland from
collecting its taxes under an invalid ordinance and from using public
monies to fund a private debt. Federal cases after 1871 reaffirmed the
power of the federal courts to issue injunctions to restrain municipal
corporations. 0°
Although their remarks were generally directed towards suits for
damages, several congressmen and senators of the Forty-Second Congress recognized that municipalities were amenable to suit in the courts
of the United States."' Clearly, Congress was aware of a general
jurisdiction over local governments, and undoubtedly its members were
also aware that federal courts had power to issue injunctions restraining municipal actions.
55 78 U.s. (11 Wall.) 108 (1870).
561d. at 110.
57 14 F. Cas. 1043 (No. 8,025)
5

(C.C.D.C. 1841).

Id. at 1044-45.

t9 6 F. Cas. 629 (No. 3,275) (C.C.D. Ore. 1868).
60 See, e.g., Phillips v. Detroit, 19 F. Cas. 512 (No. 11,101) (C.C.E.D. Mich.
1877) ; Ranger v. New Orleans, 20 F. Cas. 269 (No. 11,564) (C.C.D. La. 1875).
61See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 777 (1871) (remarks of Senator Sherman) ; Yee id. 821 (remarks of Senator Sherman) ; id. 788 (remarks of Representative
Kerr).
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As some courts have sensed, the holding in Monroe was broader
than warranted by its facts or by the legislative history on which it was
based. The reasons for the defeat of the Sherman amendment-that
it would impose a direct tax on municipal corporations and would
permit Congress to impose duties on cities and counties which they
might not be empowered to carry out-are inapplicable to suits for
prohibitory injunctions. Thus, Congress did not intend to prohibit
such suits in the federal courts, but rather sought to permit those
courts to exercise what jurisdiction they had in 1871 over municipal
corporations. The federal courts had general equity powers to issue
injunctions against municipalities. Thus, the reasoning of Monroe does
not apply to actions for prohibitory injunctions and such relief may be
granted to restrain municipal corporations.
This Comment has focused on prohibitory injunctions because
they do not ordinarily require a municipality to appropriate funds, or
impose obligations on the city to use its police power in a particular,
affirmative manner. Mandatory injunctions, on the other hand, may
sometimes necessitate the type of affirmative action Congress refused to
require of municipalities: such injunctions may be impermissible under
Monroe. In some instances this problem may be side-stepped by
phrasing a prayer for relief in prohibitory terms. For example, a
federal court may not be empowered to require a municipality to make
affirmative renovations in a city jail where the conditions constitute
cruel and unusual punishment; but the court could enjoin the city
from imprisoning persons in such a jail in violation of their constitutional rights. The city would rather renovate the jail than release
the prisoners; but then the municipality, not the court, would be
compelling the affirmative action. To avoid such abstract considerations, however, a court might well choose as a matter of propriety not
to issue such an injunction, and simply declare the existence of the
unconstitutional condition. In any event, Monroe need not be read to
preclude the federal courts from issuing any injunction against municipal corporations under section 1983. A viable distinction exists
between legal and injunctive relief, and the federal courts should not
hesitate to recognize it.

